

# CREATING A SENSE OF URGENCY

## THE SEA SERVICES REACH OUT FOR PUBLIC SUPPORT IN DEVELOPING THE NATION'S MARITIME STRATEGY

BY RICHARD H. WAGNER  
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**O**n 23 March, the Navy hosted a public forum at the New York Athletic Club entitled: "Global Approaches to Global Threats and Opportunities: Defining a New Maritime Strategy for the Nation." This forum was one of a series that is being held around the country at the behest of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael G. Mullen. With the support of Admiral Thad Allen, Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, and General James Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps, this is not just a Navy project but encompasses the other maritime services.

What the services are seeking to do is to develop a new maritime strategy. By "strategy," the services mean the ways and means to achieve a vision. "So, today's discussion is going to be about the ways and means to achieve our national aspirations." Vice Admiral John G. Morgan, Jr., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans & Strategy, told the forum participants.

The reason for this series of forums is twofold. First, it allows the maritime services to obtain input for developing the new strategy from a wide variety of sources. Attending the New York forum were business leaders, members of the merchant marine community, naval militia, lawyers, academics, law enforcement and fire department officials, as well as numerous Navy Leaguers. The more information, the more views considered, the better should be the end product. "What we [get] from you and our own efforts, somehow that good idea, that good thinking, is going to see the light of day," explained Admiral Morgan

Second, by making the public a participant in the process, the public will have a stake in the strategy, which should facilitate its funding and implementation. "The American people are the ones who get to vote on what happens in our country. The American people resource our government, resource our defense capabilities and I am very anxious to touch as many Americans as I can. First, to have them reach an understanding of what the United States Navy is doing and secondly, in that understanding, they vote on the kind of Navy we are going to have," Admiral Mullen said.

The need for public support is particularly critical now. "If you asked me if I thought the United States of America thought it was at war, I would say 'no,'" Admiral Mullen commented. Much of the country is simply disengaged from the fight.

After nearly six years, memories of the 9/11 attacks are beginning to fade in some minds. Rear Admiral Joseph L. Nimich, USCG, Assistant Commandant for Policy & Planning pointed out: "The further you get away from 9/11 and the

further you get away from New York, the more difficult it is. The reality is that it is not as painful in the Midwest. They don't look at their vulnerabilities the way you look at your vulnerabilities. They don't question things like what happens if they shut down the St. Lawrence Seaway and nothing moves in and out - - a full third of our grain that is exported from this country moves through the Great Lakes. So, it is a struggle for us."

Meanwhile, the war in Iraq is becoming increasingly unpopular. As a result, spending on the military is likely to become less popular. Indeed, with the last elections, the Congress is likely to be less sympathetic to the military.

In addition, Admiral Mullen pointed out, "Iraq and Afghanistan will end. The ground forces that we have will return to the United States. There is no question about that. I couldn't say whether it is 12 months or 18 months or 2 years or 5 years. I don't know but I think they will come back. When they do that, one of the things I worry about is our historical tendency to isolate." As history demonstrates, after the Civil War, after World War I, and after World War II, there were deep cuts in the military, particularly in the Fleet, which gave our enemies the impression that the United States was vulnerable. Luckily, there was enough time and resources to rebuild so that those enemies could be defeated but will there be such time and resources in the future?

The Navy, of all the services, is at a particular disadvantage. As naval strategist Dr. Norman Friedman recently noted at a meeting of the New York Commandery of the Naval Order of the United States, "what navies do is both terribly important and not very visible." If one looks at history, sea battles with other navies were only a small

proportion of what navies have done. Most of naval time and effort has been spent on preventing bad things from happening. Among other things, they prevent terrorists from using the seas as a highway to get from one place to another. Their presence deters criminals from engaging in acts of piracy. They deter other nations from engaging in aggression or other conduct contrary to the interests of the United States and its allies. However, none of this makes for exciting pictures likely to be featured on the evening news. As a result, while the public hears of the activities of the Army, the Marine Corps and to a lesser extent, the Air Force, and can see the Coast Guard escorting cruise ships and patrolling the harbor, the Navy is out of sight and thus, to a large extent out of mind. "Part of our engagement throughout the country is not to just create a strategy but also a medium which we can talk to the country about who we are," Admiral Mullen explained.

### *The Importance of Maritime Strategy*

**I**n order to engage the public in developing maritime strategy, it is first necessary to explain why a maritime strategy is important. Admiral Morgan began by pointing out that "Seventy percent of the world is water. Eighty percent of the world's population is moving to within 200 miles of that water and, based upon the research we've done, we believe that 90 percent of global commerce actually flows across the waters."

Dr. Win Froelich continued the discussion noting that the sea was vital to the United States when it was founded and that "we are still a maritime nation. We have land connections with two nations - - Canada and Mexico. That's

it. We are not even as a nation completely land connected. We have two states, Alaska and Hawaii, where the only connection with the U.S. is the seas. We also have territories and Puerto Rico.”

“We are the world's leading maritime nation. Twenty percent [of the world's commerce that travels on the seas] comes to or goes from the United States - - by far, the largest share. More importantly to us, roughly 15 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product flows through our ports. That does not count the multiplier effect of the countless number of jobs that are dependent upon those ports. Roughly \$2 trillion flows through our ports each year.”

The Port of New York plays a central role in this trade. “Our cargo in the U.S. is increasingly concentrated in two superports: L.A./Long Beach and the Port of New York. Those two ports are growing faster than all of the rest of the ports in the U.S. We are increasingly dependent upon those two superports. The cargo that comes into those two ports goes throughout the nation. If you think about our geography, many of our states today do not have a sea connection. In fact, the majority of our states are dependent upon the coastal states and essentially, dependent upon New York and LA/Long Beach for their local commerce.”

With modern port facilities and transportation, the cargoes that are unloaded in the superports today are on assembly lines and in stores throughout the nation within two weeks. “We have a just-in-time inventory system. If you shut the ports down for two weeks, the entire U.S. economy starts to collapse. The Department of Transportation estimates that a one day shut down on either coast takes one month to recover

from. A one week shutdown takes six months for the logistic systems to recover from.”

Dr. Froelich then offered two conclusions. “First of all, our primary goal as a nation when we talk about security, I believe, should be to maintain a flow of maritime commerce. Without that, nothing else matters because nobody has jobs.”

“Secondly, to the extent that we implement security measures that disrupt the flow of maritime commerce . . . we have done our enemies' work for them. They want to disrupt our commerce. We can't disrupt our commerce for them in the name of security.”

Of course, preserving the nation's commerce is not the only reason maritime strategy is important. Indeed, its primary importance is in public safety. For example, as often discussed in the media, a cargo container could be used to smuggle a weapon of mass destruction into the country. Along the same lines, Dr. Friedman pointed out in his talk to the Naval Order, after the Taliban was removed from power, some terrorist groups that had been using Afghanistan as their base of operations contemplated moving to Somalia. However, the presence of a U.S. and allied task force in the Red Sea and off of Africa largely frustrated these ambitions. “They had to cross the Red Sea. There is good evidence that because that force was there, they found they were blocked. By the way, the blocking force did not [intercept] many people. That isn't the real test. The real test is what these people don't do. A lot of times, the power navies have is that they cause people not to do things.”

Maritime strategy is also important as a means of influence. First, it allows the U.S. freedom of action in

projecting power. Dr. Friedman argues that in most of the world's trouble spots, "the people don't particularly like us. There is nothing that we are likely to do that will make them love us. That means that most places that we operate, we have to convince the locals to welcome us. The one unique thing about navies is that they can show up whenever they want; they can show up and stay around without permission. Partly that is international law, partly that is because navies can defend themselves if [shot at]. Once you can show up without permission, the locals are much more likely to say 'Okay, we're going to live with this, you are welcome.'"

In addition, the maritime allows the nation to demonstrate its humanitarian nature. Following the tsunami that devastated large sections of Indonesia and other countries in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, the United States Navy deployed ships to the region bringing medical assistance and other relief. When the work was done, the ships departed. This left a very positive impression, not just in the countries involved, but in the rest of the world. Admiral Mullen related how he was attending a conference when a British woman said to him: "Thank God for the United States Navy. It is the only institution in the world that could have built that kind of infrastructure, provided that kind of support, and then disengaged and gone away."

It is thus clear that maritime strategy is important but why is it important to develop a new maritime strategy now? Dr. Karl Walling, a Distinguished Professor at the Naval War College, answered that question succinctly: "The world is changing. Other conflicts do loom on the horizon,

five, ten, fifteen, twenty, years from now and whatever happens in current campaigns the Navy and other maritime services must look ahead lest their current strategies and force structure prove obsolete, even dangerous, to the American people."

### *The Historical Perspective*

The program next turned to an analysis of some of the maritime strategies the United States has had in the past and how they were developed. Such analysis is relevant because, as Dr. Walling explained: "Both the fundamental problems of strategy, in general, and the unique problems of maritime strategy, in particular, remain the same. Strategy is essentially about matching means to ends in order to achieve objectives at an acceptable level of cost and risk. A coherent strategy must integrate all tools of power that includes diplomacy, information, intelligence, economic power, and what we today call 'soft power' based upon the attractiveness of our nation. Indeed, you can usually judge the quality of a strategy by how well it integrates each of these tools. This never changes."

"The big problems that are paramount in maritime strategy are: first, to build a moat in order to provide for homeland security; second, to secure free use of the ocean, the global commons, for trade, fishing and other goods, usually by securing control of the seas and denying its use to likely adversaries; and third, to use the ocean as a highway to project power abroad in order to deter or defeat adversaries who can be beaten on their own turfs only. Given the durability of these problems, it

should come as no surprise to you that this is not the first time in our country's history that we have had the conversation about maritime strategy, which, almost by definition, must be forward looking."

The first example of such a conversation cited at the forum took place in the early years of the Republic and concerns building a moat for homeland security. Following the Revolutionary War, the Continental Navy was disbanded and it was not until 1794 that Congress authorized the construction of three large frigates, UNITED STATES, CONSTELLATION, and CONSTITUTION, to protect American commerce. During the Quasi-War with France, which was brought about primarily because of attacks by French privateers on American merchant ships in the Caribbean, the Federalists led by Alexander Hamilton added ships to the fleet. Several of the maritime states, including New York, contributed frigates to the Navy.

Hamilton recognized that it would not be possible for the young United States to match the fleets of the great powers of the time, Britain and France. However, if the United States had a small but formidable ocean-going navy operating primarily in the Caribbean, it would be able to tip the balance of power between Britain and France in an area that was economically important to both. If one of the great powers was threatening United States' interests, the U.S. could ally itself with the other great power and thus deter the threatening power. If it came to war, such an alliance would place the United States in a stronger position than if it tried to go it alone. "Through such a maritime strategy, Hamilton believed the

European powers would respect American neutrality meaning that Americans could trade around the world and their shipping would be unmolested. Through such a strategy Hamilton argued the United States could grow strong whatever the winds of war in Europe."

While the Federalists saw America's future as lying with commerce and interaction with foreign nations, their rivals, the Democratic Republicans, led by Thomas Jefferson, saw the country as primarily agrarian and insular. Jefferson viewed a navy as an unnecessary expense. What protection the expanse of the ocean did not provide, economic sanctions, such as embargoes on trade with any threatening power, and a few coastal gunboats could make up. Moreover, Jefferson argued a large federal fleet would result in a large federal government which would be a threat to the liberty of individual Americans. As a result, when the Federalists were driven from office in the election of 1800, Jefferson began to dismantle the fleet they had built. It was only the advent of the Barbary Coast War that kept him from completely eliminating the ocean-going Navy.

Jefferson's maritime strategy failed. It overlooked the fact that the rest of the western world was at war in what are often called the Napoleonic Wars. Britain and her allies did not want the U.S. trading with France and Napoleon did not want the U.S. trading with Britain so they both attacked American merchant shipping. Jefferson's Embargo Act had little effect on the belligerents but sent the U.S. economy into a tailspin. Furthermore, when the U.S. became an active participant in this war in 1812, the Navy was unprepared and despite some

memorable actions by the Federalist-built frigates, American shipping was all but driven from the seas by the Royal Navy. Moreover, the British were able to use their control of the seas to land expeditionary forces such as the one that burnt Washington D.C. The New England states came within one vote of seceding from the Union and making a separate peace. "A case could be made that Jefferson's maritime strategy came within a hair's breath of destroying the Union and with it the Republic in its infancy."

Dr. Walling closed this example with the following opinion: "Perhaps Jefferson paid so much attention to what the country wanted that he failed to frame the kind of maritime strategy that it needed most. Perhaps Hamilton paid so much attention to the kind of maritime strategy the country needed that he failed to listen enough to what the American people wanted with the result that his strategy was rejected in 1800. It would seem that maritime strategists today must therefore learn from the mistakes of both Hamilton and Jefferson. They must convince the American people to want the kind of strategy they need but, in order to do effectively, they have to listen to what the country wants."<sup>1</sup>

The second example of a conversation about maritime strategy took place at the end of the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th Century. In his landmark book, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahon, USN, argued, according to Dr. Walling, that "commerce was the foundation of military power, especially in the industrial age." Since most commerce went over the sea, whoever controlled the sea would control commerce and by

doing so control the foundations of military power. The key to controlling the sea was to have a large fleet of battleships that would defeat the enemy's battleships in a large surface action. The victor could then blockade the loser, stifle its trade and with it, the foundation of its military power. Mahan's work impressed the leading statesmen of the day and all the great powers constructed battleship navies.

Mahan's critics argued that battleships were too expensive to lose and that concentrating exclusively on building battleships deprived navies of other options such as projecting power by landing armies ashore or of building submarines to attack the enemy's commerce. The critics, however, were unsuccessful in halting the international race to build battleships.

"The result was that when the United States entered World War I, it had the wrong navy. There were no decisive battleship engagements in World War I, only might-have-beens, including [the Battle of] Jutland. The nature of this war was a struggle of attrition with the German U-boat threat almost winning the war for Germany. The American Navy began the war with lots of battleships but few destroyers to protect American commerce and troop transports. Fortunately, we had just enough spare industrial capacity to produce hundreds of submarine chasers to secure our lines of communication for those transports and our merchant fleet."<sup>2</sup>

The third conversation about maritime strategy took place in the years prior to World War II and "is about using the ocean as a highway to project power." Following World War I, the nation's military forces were drastically reduced. In addition, arms control

treaties focused on navies. "The result of the naval arms control agreements of the 1920s and early 1930s as well as failure to enforce the Versailles Treaty limiting German rearmament, however, was that as the Germans and the Japanese built up their navies, ours was reduced."<sup>3</sup>

President Roosevelt and Congressman Carl Vinson became alarmed not only about the relative size of the Fleet but also about its make-up and its ability to fight a two-ocean war. While they were able to obtain authorization for the North Carolina-class and South Dakota-class battleships and the carriers HORNET (CV 7) and WASP (CV 8) during the late 1930s, Congress did not pass legislation for a large build-up of the Navy until after the fall of France in 1940 when it appeared that Germany would obtain control of the French fleet and possibly the British fleet.<sup>4</sup>

"What enabled Roosevelt and Vinson to adapt just in time to avoid disaster in World War II was the growing threat of the Axis powers - a palpable perceptible threat. We might not be so lucky or wise or both again. This indicates to me that matching strategic needs to public wants is sometimes a matter of urgent necessity. It must be done in time to have a decisive effect."

#### *The Sea Services Today and Tomorrow*

In the next portion of the forum, flag-level officers from each of the military sea services spoke on the state of his service and planning for the future.

#### *The Navy*

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullin spoke about the Navy. "Our Navy today is in great shape. It is out and about. It is expeditionary. While it is 276 ships, and that is not President Reagan's 600, they are 276 remarkably capable ships that have a broad spectrum of capabilities. They are a deterrent force as well as an engaged force."

"We are engaged in the Western Pacific, we are engaged in places around the world and some of them, up to a few years ago, we never thought we would be there. . . We have 500 or 600 Sailors on the Horn of Africa, near Somalia. 5,000 sailors ashore in Iraq and about 1,500 in Afghanistan in support missions, doing things we just didn't expect would happen. And, almost 30,000 Sailors who are in CENTCOM per se - - 13,000 ashore and the remainder who are at sea right now."

"I really see our missions expanding. Literally today, our first missions start for our riverine squadrons in the area north of Baghdad. The last time we had any kind of riverine [force] was in Vietnam. We brought that back. That is not just the Vietnam-type riverine capability per se. In the long run, my view is that it is a strategic asset that lives in the very shallow waters throughout the world."

"I believe that in the Navy and in the Marine Corps, we are going to have to be much more special forces-like in the future - - smaller units, more precision, more lethal. [We should be] engaged out and about throughout the world routinely so that when something happens, we have a relationship as opposed to have to establish a relationship."

In addition to its military operations, the Navy is performing humanitarian relief missions, building upon the work it did following the 2004 tsunami. "Just this last year we sent the hospital ship MERCY back to Indonesia to reengage, not just show up for a crisis. We had several countries represented. We had upwards of 11 nongovernmental organizations represented including medical personnel from [Massachusetts General Hospital]. The kind of assistance, help and aid that USNS MERCY provided this last year [treating] over 60,000 patients [and going to] Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Indonesia was extraordinary. That is an investment in the future."

"We only have two hospital ships. They are reserve hospital ships. One lives in San Diego; one lives in Baltimore. But, what we have started, essentially, is a deployment every year. This year the hospital ship on the East Coast, the COMFORT, will go down to South America and be down there several months conducting the same kind of missions that [MERCY] conducted last year."

"In addition to that, we have other ships that I have made available to do these kinds of humanitarian missions. Quite frankly, [such missions] are right up our alley. Since I first deployed in 1969, when [we've gone] into port, we've always gone to the local communities to say what can we do? Can we help with your schools? Can we do whatever the projects are? So, it is not foreign to us at all, it is a core strength."

Admiral Mullen noted several areas of the world that have drawn his particular attention. "I am concerned about where China is going and the navy that they are developing. They are a

growing economy. They clearly have a growing navy. They have some huge internal and external challenges. We are watching them grow and a peaceful rising China is a good thing for all the economic reasons we talked about earlier."

"What [our] leadership continues to ask of them is transparency of intent as they develop this capability. One view of China is that they are a country that is growing at 8, 9, or 10 percent... Their people are getting connected to the world. They've got about a [population of one] billion that they've got challenges with. They are resources poor. So, would it cause you to scratch your head to think that they would go out and build a navy to protect their sea lines of communication? Absolutely not, it is what we do. It is the intent issue that is most concerning. We have just been very persistent in trying to understand that. We believe we can get to that through engagement." Accordingly, Admiral Mullen has met and plans to continue to meet with the leaders of the Chinese navy.

"I am very concerned with the emergence of Iran and where she is going." In particular, the CNO noted Iran's covert intervention in the fighting in Lebanon last summer.

"If you want to look at a continent that I think will require significant engagement in the future, look at Africa."

"I want to applaud all the efforts that have gone into ensuring that nothing has happened - - no major event has occurred in this country since 9/11. It is not because they are not trying. Down the road, it certainly could happen again."

"I'm clearly concerned about space and the militarization of space."

Clearly, the Chinese shooting down that satellite a couple of months ago was an alarming event to all of us. We are investing in [space], we are not ignoring it. I want to give you a significant amount of confidence there within what I am able to say in an open forum like this. The Navy uses space an awful lot as do all the services [and will do so] more and more in the future."

How is the Navy positioning itself to respond to these challenges? "In me, as the Chief of Naval Operations, I am a balanced guy. So, I am not a guy who is going to put all my eggs in one basket. I have been around too long and have seen the world change too much. I have seen our Navy adapt itself - - the Navy we built for the Soviet challenge - - which is adapting itself exceptionally well today in the missions that we have and literally in the expanding missions that we have. So, that has been my approach."

There "are three things I am focusing on. To build leaders, to maintain our readiness, but the most challenging one is to build a fleet for the future. [We have] 276 ships and I have got a plan to build a navy to 313. But, it does take resources and, at the end of the day, I've got to place bets. I've got to resource what is going on under the strategy that we think is right for the future. For me, it is \$115 billion a year that I have to figure out where to put it. [It is a] significant amount of money [but there is] tremendous pressure on that budget right now."

Even though the Navy's role is expanding, Admiral Mullen does not favor resurrection of the draft. "I'm very much in favor of the all-volunteer force because of the quality of the force. The young people that we have today, the all volunteer force, they are extraordinary.

They are night and day compared to where we were 30 or 40 years ago after the draft ended."

"The advantage that we can both sustain and achieve in the future requires a healthy investment in technology. I don't mean just for fighting, I mean for developing all the capabilities that we as a country and we as a people want for the future. We have a pretty powerful capability to do that in this country and we must continue to do that on a commercial and on the military side."

"This Administration has given us a terrific overarching strategic umbrella in the National Security for Maritime Strategy for all the maritime services. It is in that umbrella that we are looking to make sure that we have our strategy right for the Navy, Marine Corps and the Coast Guard - - the maritime strategy of the future in this very dynamic world. I believe we have entered a new era, how far into it, I don't know, but I believe it is going to last for a long time. I tell young people today who are joining the services that I expect when they've been in as long as I that we will still be at it or it will just be ending. It is 30, 40 years, it is generational."

Admiral Mullen firmly believes that the United States cannot go it alone in meeting all of these challenges and so he has developed and promoted the concept of a "1,000-ship navy." "We have got to have partners in this. We have got to have coalitions in this. We have a significant set of common problems in the maritime world. It is drugs, it is illegal immigration, it is weapons of mass destruction, and it is slavery. Those things add up in some estimates as high as \$2 trillion worth of illegal economy. When our [economy] is \$13 trillion or so, [it is clear that these illegal activities are] very profitable and

[because of] that profitability, they will do anything to defend it."

"I have nations, big and small, navies, large and small, and coast guards who are extremely engaged now trying to figure out how we can work together. It involves something else that is fundamental to the underpinnings of the future, i.e., transparency of information - - sharing data. We don't like to do that. We like to hold our cards very close. I don't believe we are going to be able to do that in the future. In that transparency, you develop trust and in that trust, you develop a greater partnership. I think in the long run that helps contribute much more significantly to security, which is a necessary ingredient to help the economy in the future."

"And this idea, that I gave in a presentation in Newport in the fall of 2005, has taken off like wildfire with my counterparts from around the world to a much greater degree than I ever expected it would. One of the reasons is that the barriers to entry were very low. It didn't require you to be a member of NATO. You didn't have to ask permission of some organization."

The concept of the 1,000-ship navy has "resonated so well not just because the barriers are low to get in but also we have a common bond. When I talk to sailors around the world, we have a common bond that we understand. We know how to go to sea. Even countries with different languages, we have a baseline where we can exchange information on what we are doing out there."

In addition, for the United States, implementing this concept "is not very expensive. We've set up information sharing capabilities in Liberia [and] in other ports which never thought that they

would be able to see their harbors, see their coasts, in a very inexpensive way. It is a cheap investment to provide the kind of security and create the type of partnership that we are getting in lots of places." Unfortunately, under current laws and regulations, "it is very challenging for me to make small investments, which have huge leverage, into navies and coast guards from other countries."

Admiral Mullen concluded by observing that despite the unpopularity of the Iraq war abroad, "there is an expectation that the United States will continue to lead. I don't mean arrogantly and I don't mean always from the front, but that we are, as a country, with our \$13 trillion economy, expected to be out there and that underpins obviously the need to have a strong military to support that engagement in places we are now and in places and with cultures that we don't know we are going to yet."

### *The Marine Corps*

Major General, Stephen T. Johnson, USMC, Deputy Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, spoke on behalf of the Marine Corps.

"The threats in the future are changing from what they have been in the past. We no longer have just the single, large-scale enemy that we did in the past, but we have many. We have threats that are spawned from lack of resources, threats that are spawned from different ideologies and different religions. Our borders are dissolving in many cases. We are threatened in space, we are threatened in cyberspace. We have to adjust in the future because these threats are the ones that are going to affect our vital interests and affect our

nation as a whole." "As we contemplate what we are going to look like in the next few years in the Marine Corps, we recognize that we are going to be facing different kinds of threats and we are not going to be fighting the same battles that we had to fight in the past. So, we are grappling with some of these issues as well."

"Teamwork is another concept that we are all going to deal with in the future and use because teamwork is going to give us the capability to meet some of these threats that we see out there in the future. The Navy-Marine Corps team, in my view, is very well-positioned to face some of the threats that we are going to see in the future."

"I think that we are going to see a Navy-Marine Corps team that will be able to be more forward present in this world, which is more dangerous [because] the threats are more irregular. Forward presence is going to give us the capability to be out there to be engaged with coalition partners [and] to be engaged in other parts of the world. By being able to use those vessels and use those Marines and Sailors, we can continue to be engaged and be out there and be present but not be so present that we become burdensome to our friends or [give our enemies] a reason for taking us on. That kind of capability is going to allow us to be more relevant in the future. By being present, by being forward-deployed, I think we can forestall and reduce some of the threats that would affect our country by providing a forward-deployed 'moat,' if you will."

"I believe our capabilities in the current fight have taught us a lot of lessons that we will bring to the Navy-Marine Corps team in the future. We have learned some very hard lessons in

the current fight in Afghanistan and Iraq. They are reflected in the development of some of our technology, some of our equipment [and] weapons that we are going to have in the future and in our organization. I believe that that will also bring further strength to the Navy-Marine Corps team and to our country as a whole."

"Let me assure you that the fighting capabilities of the Marines are as good as it has ever been. With our Commandant's emphasis on it, it will continue to be. The one thing about the current fight that we are in today in Iraq is that it is an irregular battlefield. The Marines there are not only involved in close combat in many cases but they are also doing governance issues, helping to stand-up economies, trying to turn on the electricity, things like that. Marines are doing a number of things that maybe they haven't done in the past. The downside of it is that while Marines are [being] trained to do those things, they are not [being] trained to do some of the core competencies that we always had and will have in the future - - combined arms operations, amphibious operations, particularly concern the Commandant. One of the reasons he has asked for and will receive this year, the increase in Marines is to enable us to have more time so that commanders can spend some time training in some of the competencies for the future. While those things will not be the only things that Marines will be involved in, you've got to save them because you never know and we have got to be ready."

"I can't stress enough the importance of the all-volunteer force. And, I can tell you, having been a member of it, having led them and served with them, there is none finer in the world. You and I as Americans are

very, very fortunate to live in a country where people are willing to volunteer. And, they keep volunteering. We have been in a war for five years and five years in which there have been hard times. Close to 800 Marines have been killed in that war, so far. Yet, they keep re-enlisting, they keep signing-up in the first place and they keep coming back for more. Their families continue to support them because of the resources that are available for families. So, you live in a great country and this all-volunteer force is one of the greatest experiments, and one of the greatest demonstrations of the greatness of our nation."

In conclusion, General Johnson pointed out that the Marine Corps is "a partner in the maritime strategy. We will be elements of it; we will be given equal opportunity to contribute to it and to participate in it. Our action officers are working with those in the Navy to contribute to the development of this maritime strategy. We are members of the team and we hope that our inclusion in that team and our contribution as a whole will continue to help this great country."

### *The Coast Guard*

**A**dmiral Nimich spoke about maritime strategy from the Coast Guard perspective. "Strategy is important to focus our efforts. There are seams out there. There are seams between law enforcement and military action. There are seams between global and domestic. That is where our enemy takes us and we need to close those seams."

"Why the Coast Guard, the Navy and the Marine Corps as a team? Because we need to look at this all the

way from law enforcement to military and prevention. We need to look at the away game and the domestic game. We can't allow there to be any gaps in how we look at it. It is joint, it is interagency. We have to defend all of our security interests and the maritime services have to work together to do it. "

The maritime services are working together. "It is happening every day down in the Caribbean and in the Eastern Pacific in terms of counter-narcotics by putting Coast Guard law enforcement detachments on Navy vessels. The law enforcement authority resides in that detachment. The Navy vessel [provides] the detection, the monitoring, and the speed to get us where we need to be. The actual boarding is turned over as a law enforcement boarding to the Coast Guard. We have done that for sanctions over in the Mediterranean [and] over in the Middle East, so we have a very close working relationship in that regard."

Another example involves the sharing of information. "There are certain laws that prohibit [the Department of Defense] from seeing certain information. But right now, I will tell you that there is a common watch floor in Maryland that has Coast Guard intelligence analysts sitting right next to Navy analysts. They can talk about all this; [the Navy] just can't own the information. So, we are working hand-in-glove in terms of making sure that we cover that spectrum from law enforcement through military power."

However, cooperation must extend beyond the uniformed maritime services. "The Goldwater-Nichols Acts of 1986 brought the military together so that there is a unity of command. That commander, whether it is Navy forces, Air Force forces, or Marine forces, owns

those forces and is in command. When the New York City Police Department, the New York City Fire Department and the Coast Guard work together on the waterfront, the Coast Guard cannot order the Police Department to do anything nor can the Police Department order the Coast Guard. But, we make it work because we have common interests. We need to be able to develop those common interests in a way that can respond to every maritime threat."

The Coast Guard also plays a role in securing international cooperation. To illustrate, "of the 14 countries that make up the Central Command, 13 of them have navies, ten of them have coast guards and those coast guards are not in their departments of defense or in their department of the interior. The 1,000-ship navy has to be able to communicate with law enforcement agencies as well as other military agencies. The Coast Guard helps bring that to the fight."

Admiral Nimich emphasized that in the ongoing fight we must improve our ability to detect anomalies in the vast amount of things that are shipped over the ocean. He noted that because of improved intelligence the Coast Guard is seizing record quantities of cocaine. However, "there is no radar system around this country. Our country has great vacancies about the ability to detect."

"We need to secure [our borders] not just here and have [a] moat [around our borders], we need to secure the highways and we need to secure the sea lines of communication. Our border security starts in Rotterdam and Singapore. It doesn't start at the sea buoy of New York harbor. It is too late if it is at the sea buoy." Accordingly, the Coast Guard is working so that the

nation's supply chain will have sufficient visibility to detect anomalies "early enough to take intervention away from our ports, not while they are in our ports. We are working very closely with the International Secure Ports Initiative, which is an [International Maritime Organization] initiative, visiting all the ports around the world, determining that those ports are secure so that bad things can't come into the ports."

Admiral Nimich also cautioned against relying on a "point defense - - having a ship off of this particular nuclear power plant [or having] Coast Guard assets escort every liquid natural gas ("LNG") tanker into the country. That is your surest recipe for failure. If you do point defense, the enemy looks at where your vulnerabilities are. If you are guarding the LNG, they are going to look for the chlorine barge that you are not guarding. What we really need to have is a systematic operation that we look at regimes, both domestic and international, a system of awareness so that we know when people are out of line, and the ability to make impact when we see it."

In addition, "what you don't want to be doing is defending in the near time. We want to be able to look and say what is this they will do next and how can we interfere with their chain of operations now. Is it through information systems? Is it through financial systems? How do we impact them now so we never get to the event that we want to prevent?"

So that it can play its proper part on the maritime team, the Coast Guard is overhauling its assets in the Project Deepwater Program. "The recapitalization of the Coast Guard is critical to the national interest." While the Coast Guard has run up against some problems in its ship building program,

there have also been successes. "Every one of our dolphin aircraft has been re-engined so that they will be ready for another 20 years of service. We have new maritime patrol aircraft that are arriving and are prepared and are better than the last aircraft that we had."

"Global in reach, seamless in coverage, this is your Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard team."

No one expected a comprehensive maritime strategy to emerge at the end of this forum. "We don't have the answers yet. We are still in the research and refinement phase," Admiral Morgan explained.

However, the forum did achieve two important things that will help in the development of that strategy. First, it brought to the attention of a sizeable number of influential people, the issues confronting the maritime services and some of the considerations involved in addressing those issues. Since, in this democracy, public support is critical, this should be of significant help in getting the Navy, Marine Corps and the Coast Guard, the authority and the resources they need to meet these challenges. "There are going to be second and third order effects from today that we won't be able to measure," commented Admiral Morgan.

Second, from the questions and ensuing dialogue, the leaders of the services heard some of the concerns that are abroad in the public. The maritime services, to achieve public support must address those concerns, either by explaining why they are not valid or by developing a strategy that takes those challenges into account.

"Our task is enormous," Admiral Morgan concluded. "The heritage and the roots of seapower endure and they

will impact our future. The core question before us, I believe, is how will seapower influence our future and influence mankind."

## ENDNOTES

1. While it can be argued that Jefferson was merely catering to the views of his constituents in rural America and on the frontier, it also can be argued that his policies reflected his beliefs that America should not become involved with Europe and that a large federal government would be a threat to individual rights. Thus, Jefferson's mistake in designing his maritime strategy may not have been that he was too concerned about what was popular but rather that he simply failed to appreciate the world situation.

2. As one participant in the forum noted, one can take issue with this interpretation of history. First, the reason that there was no decisive battleship action in World War I was that the Royal Navy's battleship fleet was so large that the smaller German navy was reluctant to challenge it. Indeed, at Jutland, when the Germans realized that they were facing the entire British line of battle, and not just the battlecruiser squadron, they broke off the engagement and headed for port where they stayed for the remainder of the war. Thus, in effect, the British battleship fleet by its mere existence defeated the German fleet. This gave the British the ability to blockade Germany, which played a large part in bringing about the domestic unrest there that led to the armistice in 1918.

With regard to the American Navy, many of the battleships joined the British battleship fleet thus making an even more intimidating fleet in being. Indeed,

the crews of the German fleet mutinied rather than accede to the desperate plan to make an eleventh hour attack on this overwhelming combined fleet. Furthermore, the failure to build destroyers is more appropriately attributed to the Wilson Administration's belief that building the nation's armed forces would be viewed as provocative rather than on any adherence to Mahan's theories. Also, although Wilson realized after the LUSITANIA sinking that the nation would probably be drawn into the war, he also knew that isolationist support would be critical to him in the close-run 1916 election. Indeed, he campaigned on the slogan: "He kept us out of war." When war was declared in 1917, all of the branches of the U.S. armed forces were unprepared. When representatives of the Allied Powers came to Washington in the spring of 1917 to ask that an Army division be sent immediately to France, they were told that the Army did not have a whole division. They also learnt that the fleet was in no condition to go to sea. It took nearly a year for the nation to arm and to send a sizeable force to Europe, which arrived just in time to prevent the Germans from overwhelming the Allies. Thus, the policies prior to World War I are an illustration that domestic political considerations play a major part in maritime strategy and that allowing the military to become weak involves a bet that there will be enough time to rebuild when a crisis emerges.

3. There were several other factors that caused the Fleet to be reduced. At the outset, it should be noted that the arms limitation treaties focused primarily on battleships and thus only serve to explain why no modern battleship was completed during the period 1923 to 1941. The fact that it took Navy leaders

many years to appreciate the value of aircraft carriers is a major reason so few of those ships were built between the wars. In addition, during this period many believed that spending on the military was unnecessary if the country followed an isolationist agenda. Finally, from 1929 onwards, the country was in the grips of the Great Depression and there was little money to build up the Fleet.

4. That there was a real danger that these ships would come under Axis control is illustrated by the fact that one of the few battleship engagements of World War II took place between USS MASSACHUSETTS (BB 59) and the French battleship JEAN BART during Operation Torch off North Africa. The British attack on the French fleet at Oran in 1940 prevented the Germans from obtaining control over more French ships.